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Abstract: This paper investigates the average impact of government debt on per-capita GDP 
growth in twelve euro area countries over a period of about 40 years starting in 1970. It finds 
a non-linear impact of debt on growth with a turning point—beyond which the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio has a deleterious impact on long-term growth—at about 90-100% of GDP. 
Confidence intervals for the debt turning point suggest that the negative growth effect of high 
debt may start already from levels of around 70-80% of GDP, which calls for even more 
prudent indebtedness policies. At the same time, there is evidence that the annual change of 
the public debt ratio and the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio are negatively and linearly 
associated with per-capita GDP growth. The channels through which government debt (level 
or change) is found to have an impact on the economic growth rate are: (i) private saving; (ii) 
public investment; (iii) total factor productivity (TFP) and (iv) sovereign long-term nominal 
and real interest rates. From a policy perspective, the results provide additional arguments for 
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Non-technical summary  
The 2008-2009 crisis has put considerable strains on public finances in the euro area, in 
particular on government debt. Many euro area and EU countries are at high risk with regard 
to fiscal sustainability. Against this background, one important question refers to the 
economic consequences of a regime of high and potentially persistent public debt. While the 
economic growth rate is likely to have a linear negative impact on the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio, high levels of public debt are also likely to be deleterious for growth, but potentially 
after a certain threshold has been reached. It is precisely this relationship that the present 
paper seeks to investigate. From a policy perspective, a negative impact of public debt on 
economic growth strengthens the arguments for ambitious debt reduction through fiscal 
consolidation.  
The literature, in particular the empirical part, on the relationship between government debt 
and economic growth is scarce. The theoretical literature tends to point to a negative 
relationship. The empirical evidence is primarily focused on the impact of external debt on 
growth in developing countries, while for the euro area, several studies analyse the impact of 
fiscal variables, including government debt, on long-term interest rates or spreads against a 
benchmark, as an indirect channel affecting economic growth.  
This paper investigates the average relationship between the government debt-to-GDP ratio 
and the per-capita GDP growth rate in a sample of 12 euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain) for a period of roughly four decades starting in 1970.  
The basic empirical growth model is based on a conditional convergence equation that relates 
the GDP per capita growth rate to the initial level of income per capita, the 
investment/saving-to-GDP rate and population growth rate. The model is augmented to 
include the level of gross government debt (as a share of GDP). The basic estimation 
technique is panel fixed-effects corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Given 
the strong potential for endogeneity of the debt variable, especially reverse causation (low or 
negative growth rates of per-capita GDP are likely to induce higher debt burdens), we also 
use various instrumental variable estimation techniques. In addition, we find that the results 
remain robust when cyclical fluctuations in the dependent variable are eliminated by using 
the growth rate of potential or trend GDP.  
The results across all models show a highly statistically significant non-linear relationship 
between the government debt ratio and per-capita GDP growth for the 12 pooled euro area 6
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countries included in our sample. The debt-to-GDP turning point of this concave relationship 
(inverted U-shape) is roughly between 90 and 100% on average for the sample, across all 
models (the threshold for the models using trend GDP is somewhat lower). This means that, 
on average for the 12-euro area countries, government debt-to-GDP ratios above such 
threshold would have a negative effect on economic growth. Confidence intervals for the 
debt turning point suggest that the negative growth effect of high debt may start already from 
levels of around 70-80% of GDP, which calls for even more prudent indebtedness policies. 
We also find evidence that the annual change of the public debt ratio and the budget deficit-
to-GDP ratio are negatively and linearly associated with per-capita GDP growth.  
The channels through which government debt (level or change) is found to have an impact on 
the economic growth rate are: (i) private saving; (ii) public investment; (iii) total factor 
productivity (TFP) and (iv) sovereign long-term nominal and real interest rates. For the first 
three channels – private saving, public investment and TFP – a non-linear (concave) 
relationship also predominates across the various models used. As regards the channel of 
long-term sovereign interest rates, a strong and robust impact on nominal, as well as real, 
interest rates is found to come from the change in the debt ratio (first difference) and from 
the primary budget balance ratio. The level of the public debt ratio (in either linear or 
quadratic forms) is not found to be significant on average in determining long-term interest 
rates in our sample. The change in the public debt ratio and the primary budget balance prove 
to be highly statistically significant and remain robust even after controlling for short-term 
interest rates as a proxy for monetary policy effects. 
Overall, a robust conclusion of our paper is that above a 90-100% of GDP threshold, public 
debt is, on average, harmful for growth in our sample. The question remains whether public 
debt is indeed associated with higher growth below this turning point. The additional 
evidence in this analysis, i.e. that (i) the debt turning points for the first two channels (private 
saving and public investment) seem to be much below the range of 90-100%; (ii) government 
budget deficits and the change in the debt ratio are found to be linearly and negatively 
associated with growth (and the long-term interest rates), may point to a more detrimental 
impact of the public debt stock even below the threshold. 7
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The view is sometimes expressed [Professor Aba P. Lerner and Professor Domar] that a 
domestic national debt means merely that citizens as potential taxpayers are indebted to 
themselves as holders of government debt, and that it can, therefore, have little effect upon 
the economy […]. It is my purpose to refute this argument [and] to show that, quite apart 
from any distributional effects, a domestic debt may have far-reaching effects upon 
incentives to work, save, and to take risks.  
J.E. Meade (1958), Oxford Economic Papers 
1.   Introduction 
Government debt rose considerably over the past decades and this trend was generally 
accompanied by an expansion in the size of governments. For many industrial countries, the 
growth of general government expenditure was enormous in the 20
th century. As shown in 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997), the average size of government for a group of thirteen 
industrial countries
4 increased from 12% of GDP in 1913 to 43% of GDP in 1990. At the end 
of the period, average public debt-to-GDP ratio was 79% for the big governments, 60% for 
medium-seized governments and 53% for small governments.
5 
The manner in which debt builds up can be important from the perspective of its economic 
impact, as well as of the subsequent exit strategy. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) argue that war 
debts may be less problematic for future growth partly because the high war-time 
government spending comes to a halt as peace returns, while peacetime debt explosions may 
persistent for longer periods of time.  
Before the 20
th century, the accumulation of government debt was in general slow and 
occurred mainly in relation to wars. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the national 
debt of England was initiated to finance the British participation in the war of the Grand 
Alliance with France during 1689-1697. In the United States, the newly-formed federal 
government assumed the debts of the states incurred during the American Revolution, all of 
which were pooled into a single debt issue in 1790. Government debt, especially at local 
levels, was contracted to a smaller extent also for other purposes. According to the same 
source, government borrowing in its modern form first occurred in medieval Genoa and 
Venice when the city governments borrowed on a commercial basis from the newly 
                                                      
4  Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zeeland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and United States.  
5  Where big governments are defined as those with public expenditure-to-GDP ratio higher than 50%; medium-sized 
governments: between 40-50% and small governments: less than 40%.  8
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developed banks. The US states incurred substantial debts in the early part of the 19th 
century, largely for public work improvements. France’s debt increased substantially after 
1878 as a result of public work expenditures and France’s colonial expansion. According to 
some historians, England is considered to have been a leader in the modern era with respect 
to debt solvency and management techniques, while France is the country most violently 
disturbed by its national debt (Hamilton, 1947). 
Economic and financial crises are also likely to contribute to the build-up of government 
debt, as shown in a recent paper analysing severe post-World War II financial crisis.
6 In this 
context, the 2008-2009 crisis has already put considerable strains on debt and, in general, on 
public finances in the euro area countries. The euro area government deficit ratio is projected 
to increase rapidly from 0.6% of GDP in 2007 to 6.6% of GDP in 2011, while the gross 
government debt ratio is expected to surge from 66.0% to 88.5% of GDP during the same 
period
7. Overall, long-term fiscal sustainability in the euro area has deteriorated markedly 
and many expect that such effects would linger on in the medium and longer term. According 
to the latest European Commission’s Sustainability Report, many euro area and EU countries 
(8 in the euro area and 13 EU countries) are now at high risk with regard to fiscal 
sustainability. This reflects large current fiscal deficits, high debt levels, an outlook of 
possibly subdued GDP growth, as well as the projected fiscal implications of population 
ageing which are considerable in some countries. The report calls the sustainability risks in 
the EU-27 so significant that “debt sustainability should get a very prominent and explicit 
role in the surveillance procedures” under the EU Stability and Growth Pact. This is also 
reflected in the work of the so-called Van Rompuy Task Force which is looking into ways to 
strengthen economic governance in the EU. Financial markets have reacted to the 
deterioration in the fiscal situation and outlook of individual countries with significant 
increases in sovereign yield spreads. 
Against this background, one important question refers to the economic consequences of a 
regime of high and potentially persistent public debt. While the economic growth rate is 
likely to have a linear negative impact on the public debt-to-GDP ratio (a decline in the 
economic growth rate is, ceteris paribus, associated with an increase in the public debt-to-
GDP ratio), high levels of public debt are likely to be deleterious for growth. Potentially, this 
effect is non-linear in the sense that it becomes relevant only after a certain threshold has 
                                                      
6   See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
7   According to the European Commission Spring Forecast as of May 2010. 9
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been reached. It is precisely this non-linear relationship that the present paper seeks to 
investigate. 
2.  Literature Review 
The literature, in particular the empirical part, on the relationship between government debt 
and economic growth is scarce. Most studies on this topic emphasize the impact of external 
debt and debt restructuring on growth in developing countries, while analyses across 
developed countries, particularly in the euro area, are virtually absent. Yet, such analyses 
become even more relevant as euro area governments are facing mounting fiscal pressures, 
with public debt-to-GDP ratios soaring following the financial and economic crisis and likely 
to remain at elevated levels in the medium term. Several studies that focus on the euro area 
analyse the impact of fiscal variables, including government debt, on long-term interest rates 
or spreads against a benchmark, as an indirect channel affecting economic growth.
8 
The  theoretical literature on the relationship between public debt and economic growth 
tends to point to a negative relationship. Growth models augmented with public agents 
issuing debt to finance consumption or capital goods tend to exhibit a negative relationship 
between public debt and economic growth, particularly in a neoclassical setting.  
Modigliani (1961), refining contributions by Buchanan (1958) and Meade (1958), argued 
that the national debt is a burden for next generations, which comes in the form of a reduced 
flow of income from a lower stock of private capital. Apart from a direct crowding-out 
effect, he also pointed out to the impact on long-term interest rates, possibly in a non-linear 
form “if the government operation is of sizable proportions it may significantly drive up 
[long-term] interest rates since the reduction of private capital will tend to increase its 
marginal product” (p. 739). Even when the national debt is generated as a counter-cyclical 
measure and “in spite of the easiest possible monetary policy with the whole structure of 
interest rates reduced to its lowest feasible level” (p. 753), the debt increase will generally 
not be costless for future generations despite being advantageous to the current generation. 
Modigliani considered that a situation in which the gross burden of national debt may be 
offset in part or in total is when debt finances government expenditure that could contribute 
                                                      
8   A rather extended empirical literature deals with the impact of fiscal variables, such as taxes and government expenses, 
on economic growth, with somewhat controversial results, depending on factors such as the time span used, 
methodological approaches, sample heterogeneity etc. For a relatively recent study reviewing such issues, see inter alia, 
Hiebert et al (2002). The study finds a negative relationship between fiscal profligacy (government size) and trend 
economic growth among fourteen EU member countries for the period 1970-2000. It concludes that past improvements 
in the government budget position for the “old” EU countries have tended to support long-term economic growth. 10
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to the real income of future generations, such as productive public capital formation.  
Diamond (1965) adds the effect of taxes on the capital stock and differentiates between
public external and internal debt. He concludes that, through the impact of taxes needed to
finance the interest payments, both types of public debt reduce the available lifetime
consumption of taxpayers, as well as their saving, and thus the capital stock. In addition, he 
contends that internal debt can produce a further reduction in the capital stock arising from
the substitution of government debt for physical capital in individual portfolios.  
Adam and Bevan (2005) find interaction effects between deficits and debt stocks, with high
debt stocks exacerbating the adverse consequences of high deficits. In a simple theoretica
model integrating the government budget constraint and debt financing, they find that an
increase in productive government expenditure, financed out of a rise in the tax rate, will be 
growth-enhancing only if the level of (domestic) public debt is sufficiently low.   
Saint-Paul (1992) and Aizenman et al. (2007) analyze the impact of fiscal policy, proxied
inter alia by the level of public debt, in endogenous growth models and find a negative
relation as well.  
Several theoretical contributions have focused on the adverse impact of external debt on the 
economy and the circumstances under which such impact arises.
9 In this line of research
Krugman (1988) coins the term of “debt overhang” as a situation in which a country’s 
expected repayment ability on external debt falls below the contractual value of debt
Cohen’s (1993) theoretical model posits a non-linear impact of foreign borrowing on
investment (as suggested by Clements et al. (2003), this relationship can be arguably
extended to growth). Thus, up to a certain threshold, foreign debt accumulation can promote
investment, while beyond such a point the debt overhang will start adding negative pressure
on investors’ willingness to provide capital.  
In the same vein, the growth model proposed by Aschauer (2000), in which public capital has 
a non-linear impact on economic growth, can be extended to cover the impact of public debt
Assuming that government debt is used at least partly to finance productive public capital, an
increase in debt would have positive effects up to a certain threshold and negative effect
beyond it.  
The channels through which public debt can potentially affect economic growth are diverse. 
                                                      
9  For more details on the literature review on this topic see Clements et al. (2003) and Schclarek (2004). 11
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Meade (1958) was drawing attention to the fact that the removal of the “deadweight debt” 
would: (i) raise the incentive of households to save (the Pigou-effect)
10; (ii) improve the 
incentives for work and enterprise; (iii) possibly allow for a decrease in income taxation at a 
later stage as a result of saving interest payments on the budget (improving even more the 
incentives for work and enterprise).  
An important channel through which public debt accumulation can affect growth is that of 
long-term interest rates. Higher long-term interest rates, resulting from more debt-financed 
government budget deficits, can crowd-out private investment, thus dampening potential 
output growth. Indeed, if higher public financing needs push up sovereign debt yields, this 
may induce an increased net flow of funds out of the private sector into the public sector. 
This may lead to an increase in private interest rates and a decrease in private spending 
growth, both by households and firms (see Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). While the 
empirical findings on the relationship between public debt and long-term interest rates are 
diverse, a significant number of recent studies
11 suggest that high debt and deficits may 
contribute to rising sovereign long-term interest rates and yield spreads.  
In Krugman’s specification, the external debt overhang affects economic growth through 
private investment, as both domestic and foreign investors are deterred from supplying 
further capital. Other channels may be total factor productivity, as proposed in Patillo et al. 
(2004), or increased uncertainty about future policy decisions, with a negative impact on 
investment and further on growth, as in Agénor and Montiel (1996) and in line with the 
literature of partly-irreversible decision making under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between debt and growth is scarce and primarily 
focused on the role of external debt in developing countries.  
Among more recent studies, several find support for a non-linear impact of external debt on 
growth, with deleterious effects only after a certain debt-to-GDP ratio threshold. Pattillo et al. 
(2002) use a large panel dataset of 93 developing countries over 1969-1998 and find that the 
impact of external debt on per-capita GDP growth is negative for net present value of debt 
levels above 35-40% of GDP. Clements et al. (2003) investigate the same relationship for a 
panel of 55 low-income countries over the period 1970-1999 and find that the turning point 
                                                      
10  In Meade’s arguments, because of the assumption of a capital levy to remove the debt, the net income of a citizen would 
remain the same, while his property value would decrease. The Pigou-effect consists in a citizen’s net saving being 
higher (or his net dissaving lower), the lower is the ratio of his capital to his tax-free income. 
11   See Ardagna et al. (2007) and Laubach (2009) for the long-term sovereign yields and Codogno et al. (2003); Schuknecht 
et al. (2009); Barrios et al. (2009), and Attinasi et al (2009), among others, for long-term sovereign bond yield spreads.  12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1237
August 2010
in the net present value of external debt is at around 20-25% of GDP. Other previous 
empirical studies that find a non-linear effect of external debt on growth include Smyth and 
Hsing (1995) and Cohen (1997). On the other hand, Schclarek (2004) finds a linear negative 
impact of external debt on per-capita growth (and no evidence of an inverted U-shape 
relationship) in a panel of 59 developing countries over the period 1970-2002.  
Schclarek (2004) also investigates the relationship between gross government debt and per-
capita GDP growth in developed countries. No robust evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship is found for a sample of 24 industrial countries with data averaged over seven 5-
year periods between 1970 and 2002.
12 In contrast, a recent study by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010), which analyses (through simple correlation statistics) the developments of public 
(gross central government) debt and the long-term real GDP growth rate in a sample of 20 
developed countries over a period spanning about two centuries (1790 - 2009), finds that: (i) 
the relationship between government debt and long-term growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios 
below a threshold of 90% of GDP; (ii) above 90%, the median growth rate falls by one 
percent and the average by considerably more. A similar change in the behaviour of GDP 
growth in relation to the debt ratio is also found by Kumar and Woo (2010). 
3.  Empirical model, data and results 
3.1  Direct impact of public debt on growth 
3.1.1  Results with the whole sample  
We investigate the relationship between government debt-to-GDP ratio and per-capita GDP 
growth rate in a sample of 12 euro area countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Data 
originates primarily from the European Commission AMECO database, covering the period 
1970-2011 and thus including also the EC Autumn Forecast data for 2009-2011. (However, 
since for some control variables the forecast is not available, most of the models are 
estimated only up to 2008.) Using this relatively restricted cross-sectional sample also helps 
mitigating the issue of heterogeneity, which often turns problematic in standard growth 
regressions.  
                                                      
12   The industrial countries used in the study are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. For the last period of time (2000-2002), data is averaged over 3 years 
only. 13
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The empirical growth model is based on a conditional convergence equation that relates the 
GDP per capita growth rate to the initial level of income per capita, the investment/saving-to-
GDP rate and the population growth rate. The model is augmented to include the level of 
gross government debt (as a share of GDP). Since we are interested in checking whether 
there exists a non-linear impact of government debt on growth, we use a quadratic equation 
in debt. Using debt in a linear form does not yield significant results.  
Other control variables that we use in the estimation of the growth equation include: (i) fiscal 
indicators (i.e. a proxy for the average tax rate and the government balance, both in cyclically 
adjusted terms) to allow more extensively for the possibility of fiscal policy affecting 
economic growth; (ii) the long-term (sovereign) real interest rate, capturing the impact of 
inflation and the effects of the fiscal-monetary policy mix; (iii) indicators for the openness of 
the economy and external competitiveness (such as the sum of export and import shares in 
GDP; terms of trade growth rate; real effective exchange rate REER) to expand the model 
beyond a closed-economy form. Given the relatively small dimension of the country cross 
section and the need to control for country specific characteristics, the equation also contains 
country-fixed effects. The country dummies capture economic and social characteristics 
specific for each country that remain broadly unchanged over time. In addition, year 
dummies are included to control for common shocks across countries that occurred over the 
period of the analysis, as well as for economic and monetary regime changes, such as the 
creation of the monetary union and the introduction of the euro. A list of the variables used in 
the various regression models, as well as the sources of data, is presented in Appendix 1.  
The basic estimation equation is as follows: 
 
where  k it g +       = the growth rate of GDP per capita, k = 1 or 5 (three different measures are 
used in the empirical estimation: annual growth rate  1 + it g ; 5-year cumulative 
overlapping growth rate  5 / + t it g , where t takes annual values; and 5-year 
cumulative non-overlapping growth rate  5 + it g , where t takes the values at the 
start of each half-decade); 
ln(GDP/cap)it                 = natural logarithm of the initial level of GDP per capita 
debtit                          = gross government debt as a share of GDP 
saving/inv.rateit   = saving or investment (gross capital formation) as a share of GDP (the 
+ + + + + + = + it it it it it k it growth pop rate inv saving debt debt cap GDP g . . / ) / ln( 2
2
1 φ δ γ γ β α
                  other controls (fiscal; openness; interest rate) it t i ε ν µ + + +    (eq.1) 14
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variables are used in the empirical estimation in aggregated terms, total 
national saving/investment rate, as well as on a disaggregated basis, as public 
and private saving/ investment rate)  
other controls                  => see description in the text above 
i µ                            = country fixed effects 
t ν                            = time fixed effects 
it ε                            = the error term. 
The basic estimation technique is panel fixed-effects corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation up to order 2 (for the annual growth rate and the cumulative 5-year non-
overlapping growth rate) or 5 (for the cumulative 5-year overlapping growth rate). The 
results across various models are presented in Table 1 Appendix 2. 
Given the strong potential for endogeneity of the debt variable, especially reverse causation 
(low or negative growth rates of per-capita GDP are likely to induce higher debt burdens), we 
use various instrumental variable estimation techniques (see results in Table 2 Appendix 2).  
As stated in Hiebert et al. (2002), in a panel context, most studies on growth regressions have 
made use of the instrumental variable (IV) approach to deal with the issue of simultaneity 
bias. The estimators used in our paper are either 2-SLS (two-stage least square) or GMM 
estimators
13. With the GMM estimator, we also correct for the heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation that may be present in the error structure by using the consistent estimator. 
The two-step GMM presents some efficiency gains over the traditional IV/2-SLS estimator 
derived from the use of the optimal weighting matrix, the overidentifying restrictions of the 
model, and the relaxation of the independent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) assumption, see 
Baum et al (2007).
14 
We instrument the debt variable for each country through either its time lags (up to the 5
th 
lag) or through the average of the debt levels of the other countries in the sample. Both 
instruments are highly correlated with the instrumented variable, as shown by the first stage 
statistics, such as Shea partial R-square. While using lagged terms of regressors as 
instruments is relatively common practice with macroeconomic data, for the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, this may be more problematic given the high persistency of the debt stock variable. 
                                                      
13   As implemented in Stata with the ivreg2 command developed by Baum et al. (2007). 
14   For an exactly identified model, the efficient GMM and traditional IV/2SLS estimators coincide. 15
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Thus, we also calculate for every country and year in the sample the average public debt-to-
GDP ratio of the other countries and use this variable as an instrument. As such, this 
instrument has the advantage of not having a direct causation effect on the growth rate, at 
least if one assumes that there are no strong spillover effects between debt levels in euro area 
countries and per-capita GDP growth rate in one specific country. The endogeneity problem 
is also mitigated in our specification by the fact that the explanatory variables are all lagged 1 
or 5 years compared to the dependent variable.  
When using the annual GDP growth rate we capture a short-term impact of debt on growth, 
while for the 5-year specifications, we capture the (more relevant) long-term impact of debt 
on growth. The latter will also be analysed by using the potential/trend GDP growth rate as a 
dependent variable (see below the robustness checks).  
As summarized in Tables 1 and 2 of the Appendix 2,
15 the results across all models show a 
highly statistically significant non-linear relationship between the government debt ratio and 
the per-capita GDP growth rate for the 12 euro area countries included in our sample, starting 
from 1970 to present. The debt-to-GDP turning point of this concave relationship (inverted 
U-shape) is roughly between 90 and 100% on average for the sample, across all models. This 
means that, on average for the 12-euro area countries, government debt-to-GDP ratios above 
such threshold would have a negative effect on economic growth
16.  
In addition, given the persistency of the government debt-to-GDP ratio, we also estimate the 
models using debt in first differences (in a linear form as the squared term is not significant). 
We find that the annual change in the government debt-to-GDP ratio is highly statistically 
significant and negatively associated with the economic growth rate. The negative impact on 
the annual growth rate of a 1 percentage point acceleration in the yearly change of 
government debt-to-GDP ratio stands at about -0.10 pp. See Table 3 in Appendix 2 for more 
details. 
                                                      
15   Use of other control variables, mentioned above and not shown in the table models, does not change the results. 
16   The debt turning points for individual countries are, of course, likely to differ. An estimation of the regression equation 
by country with the annual growth rate as the dependent variable and using SUREG, seemingly unrelated regression 
estimator, and small sample statistics, have also been performed. For several countries in the sample, the quadratic 
relationship is also unveiled. However, due to the fact that the number of observation is relatively small, i.e. a 
maximum of 41 observations by country using annual data, the results by country are subject to considerable 
uncertainty and, therefore, they are not reported.  16
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3.1.2  Other robustness checks  
a) Controlling for other potentially relevant variables  
One additional variable to keep in mind when investigating the relationship between public 
debt and growth is the stock of private debt. The negative impact of public debt on growth 
could conceivably be stronger in countries with high private debt burdens. Unfortunately, 
data on the total private debt stock or at least private external debt
17 are not readily available 
in a consistent manner for the euro area countries for a longer time span. Instead, for this 
purpose, we use as an additional control in the growth equation the variable total domestic 
credit to the private sector,
18 the only available for our time span and the country selection, 
extracted from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. However, we do not find 
the variable to be statistically significant in determining growth in our sample across any of 
our models and its inclusion does not modify significantly the results for public debt (see 
estimation results in Table 4 Appendix 2).   
Implicit and contingent liabilities represent other factors related to public indebtedness, but 
not reflected in the government debt stock, which may affect economic performance through 
various channels. These are potential future obligations of the government related to ageing 
costs, liabilities of the private sector guaranteed by the government, other implicit or explicit 
obligations that the public sector may incur conditional on future uncertain events. 
Contingent liabilities become part of public debt once they are called, but markets (as a rule 
and depending on public availability of data) factor them in the debt premia requested for 
government borrowing. This may increase interest rates and thus slow down economic 
growth. Alternatively, high contingent liabilities related to population ageing, if not tackled 
adequately, may contribute to diverting resources from more productive purposes and thus 
reduce longer term growth perspectives, i.e. potential GDP growth. Data for contingent 
liabilities are not available in a consistent manner for the countries and the time span of our 
sample; consequently, we cannot account directly in our models for these factors. For the 
ageing-related burden, we account indirectly by using the variable old dependency ratio as an 
explanatory factor for the private saving rate; the variable is found to have a negative impact 
on private saving, which in turn is likely to contribute to slowing down future economic 
growth (for more details, see the results in the next chapter for the channel of private saving).   
                                                      
17  Data for external debt, total and disaggregated into public and private external debt, are available from the World Bank’s 
WDI (World Development Indicators) database only for developing countries.  
18  The variable, averaged annually over the period 1970-2008, ranges from 40.8% of GDP in Greece to 103.7% of GDP in 
Luxembourg. The sample annual average is 77% of GDP. 17
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b) Robustness of the polynomial functional form    
In addition to the quadratic form of the public debt-to-GDP ratio, we also check for other 
polynomial functions. Since a linear debt form does not yield significant results, we start by 
using powers higher than one—in increments of 0.2—and check for polynomial degrees up 
to power 3. Using different polynomial forms does not change our conclusions: the 
relationship remains concave (see Chart 1 in Appendix 2) and the debt turning point remains 
roughly between 90 and 100% of GDP. Using lower powers yields slightly higher debt 
turning points and the vice versa. For instance, compared to the quadratic form under a basic 
fixed-effects model that yields a debt turning point of 99.8% of GDP, using a polynomial 
form with the maximum power of 1.2 yields a debt turning point of 103.9%, while for power 
3 we obtain a turning point of 92.7% (see Table 5 in Appendix 2 for more details). As the 
power approaches 3, the coefficient of the higher-power term remains significant at the 1% 
level but it becomes very small converging towards zero as we increase the power. Including 
more than two debt terms in the regression equation (e.g. first, second, and third power) does 
not yield significant results.  
c) Impact of government debt on potential/trend GDP growth rate 
As an additional robustness check we investigate the impact of the government debt-to-GDP 
ratio on potential/trend GDP growth. In this way, we are able to: (i) capture more adequately 
a long-run impact and avoid cyclical fluctuations; (ii) mitigate the problem of endogeneity 
and especially reverse causation; (iii) test the robustness of the debt turning point.  
We use potential and trend GDP as reported in the AMECO database (Autumn 2009 forecast 
vintage) based on the European Commission’s methodology, and compute annual and 5-year 
growth rates. Results with the same instrumental variable-models as previously used for the 
growth rate of real GDP per capita are reported in Table 6 Appendix 2 for the potential GDP 
growth rate and in Table 7 (same Appendix) for trend GDP. Our conclusions remain robust: 
we find the same concave relationship, with the variables debt and debt squared highly 
statistically significant across all models and with debt turning points in a broadly similar 
range (the estimation models using the growth rate of trend GDP as a dependent variable 
seem to yield lower turning points at about 82-92% of GDP if 5-year non-overlapping growth 
rates are used).  
d) Confidence intervals for the debt turning point 
Estimating various estimated models, we are able to calculate inter-model debt turning 
points. Tables 2, 6 and 7 in Appendix 2 show that the inter-model simple average for the 18
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turning points stands at about 94% for the GDP per capita growth rate across the instrumental 
variable models (97% across all models), and 95% and 91% for the potential and trend GDP 
growth rate, respectively. 
In addition to the inter-model ranges, we also calculate confidence intervals for each model 
turning point.
19 Since the turning point is a non-linear combination (the ratio) of two 
estimated coefficients—debt and debt squared—multiplied by a scalar (-½), the normal 
distribution 95% confidence intervals (CI) estimated for each coefficient cannot be used to 
compute the CI for the turning point. We thus use two alternative approaches to assess the 
statistical uncertainty surrounding the turning point estimates: the delta method and 
bootstrapping. These methods are commonly applied to compute the standard error of non-
linear functions for which it is too complex to analytically compute the variance
20 21 (Vance, 
2006). The results are reported at the bottom of the estimation tables. 
The delta method basically expands a function of random variables (e.g. the ratio) about its 
mean using (usually a one-step) Taylor approximation, and then computes the variance. Its 
accuracy depends on the degree of linearity of the derivative function at the point that it is 
evaluated (Vance, 2006), i.e. it is a good Taylor approximation when the random variable has 
a high probability of being close enough to its mean. Therefore, the delta method assumes 
that the coefficients in the model are normally distributed, being influenced by the sample 
size (Hole, 2007). In our case, we expect the delta method
22 to be more accurate with the 
regressions using annual data (over 300 observations) than when 5-year averages are used 
(about 60-80 observations, depending on the model).  
The bootstrap method is based on simulations by drawing a large number of samples (in our 
case, 1000) with replacements, each used to derive the coefficients and calculate the turning 
                                                      
19   We thank the anonymous reviewer for suggestions in this direction. 
20   The ratio of two normally distributed variables has a Cauchy distribution (hence variance is not defined) when the two 
variables are independent and have a zero mean. As we cannot consider that the distributions of our coefficients for debt 
and debt square are independent, or that they have a zero mean, the form of the ratio distribution is computationally very 
complex and not readily available.  
21   A study (Hole 2007) comparing various approaches to estimating confidence intervals for the willingness to pay 
measures (based on the marginal rate of substitution as the ratio of the attribute coefficients) found them to be 
reasonably accurate and yielding similar results. The delta method was found to be the most accurate when the data is 
well-conditioned, while the bootstrap was considered more robust to noisy data and misspecification of the model. In 
addition to the delta and bootstrapping methods, the study also investigates the Fieller and the Krinsky Robb approaches, 
commonly applied in the willingness to pay literature. The simulation results in Hole (2007) were all based on the 
condition that a specific discrete choice model (i.e. logit) was the correct model specification. Although expected to 
yield similar results, further research was called in case of other models.  
22   As implemented in Stata using the nlcom “Nonlinear combination of estimators” command 19
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points. Confidence intervals are subsequently calculated based on the resulting distribution of 
the turning points. While bootstrapping relies on relatively few assumptions, the method is to 
be used with caution when the available sample is small (Vance, 2006). The default 
bootstrapping method
23 constructs symmetric 95% confidence intervals based on a normal 
distribution of the turning points. Non-symmetric confidence intervals based on the bias-
corrected or percentile bootstrapping can also be obtained to reflect potential skewness in the 
sampling distribution of the turning points. In our case, the bias is relatively limited, but it is 
mostly negative so that it tends to skew the confidence intervals towards the lower bound, i.e. 
the negative effects of debt tend to start at a lower level. With certain models, however, 
especially with instrumental variables, the bootstrapping procedure, as implemented in Stata, 
either rendered unstable CI when the simulation was repeated or an estimation of the 
bootstrapped standard errors was not possible due to “lack of observations”. In these cases, 
the results with the delta method are shown under the reservation that confidence intervals 
may actually start at a lower level of the lower bound (and may be non-symmetric). Either 
way, it seems that the resulting 95% confidence intervals for the debt turning point may start 
as low as 70-80% of GDP, which calls for even more prudent indebtedness policies.  
 
3.2  Channels for the impact of public debt on growth 
Another important question relates to the channels through which public debt is likely to 
have an impact on the economic growth rate. To this end, we investigate the impact of debt 
on: (i) private saving and private investment (gross fixed capital formation) rate; (ii) public 
investment (gross fixed capital formation) rate; (iii) total factor productivity (TFP); and (iv) 
sovereign long-term nominal and real interest rates. We find some evidence for the channels 
of private saving, public investment, TFP, and interest rates (see the regression results in 
Tables 1-5 in Appendix 3). For the first three channels – private saving, public investment 
and TFP – a non-linear relationship (concave) also predominates across the various models 
used.
24 
We analyse the channel of private saving ratio using the following regression equation: 
                                                      
23   As implemented in Stata using the bootstrap command. 
24    The results appear less robust than in the case of the direct channel between debt and growth (under some specifications, 
especially the most restrictive ones, the debt term, linear or/and squared, loses significance). This is likely to reflect the 
fact that public debt may influence economic growth rate through several channels simultaneously.    20
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where the variable notations are explained above and/or in Appendix 1. 
We use a dynamic panel model since the private saving rate is likely to be highly persistent 
(a similar model is also preferred for private and public investment). In addition to the lagged 
private saving ratio and the debt variable, the other control variables are the main 
determinants of saving usually employed in the literature (see for instance Masson et al., 
1998, and Schclarek, 2004). Hence, the level of the private saving ratio is assumed to depend 
also on: (i) the level of income per capita; (ii) demographic shifts and structure as proxied by 
the growth rate of the population and the ratio of the non-working age population to the 
working age population, split between old and young dependency ratio; (iii) the level of 
taxation (proxied by total government revenue as a share of GDP); (iv) the depth of the 
financial system and other financial indicators, as proxied by the share of domestic private 
credit in GDP and the long-term interest rate; (v) indicators of openness of the economy to 
capture the possibility of foreign saving inflows or outflows.  
The regression results
25 presented in Table 1 Appendix 3 broadly show a similar non-linear 
impact of public debt on private saving. Yet, now the turning point in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
is at lower levels, i.e. between 82% and 91%. Above this threshold range and holding other 
factors constant, the private sector seems to start dissaving, which may be counter-evidence 
to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. The results could be explained by the fact that 
private agents may anticipate inflationary pressures and/or troubles in the financial markets 
and/or transfer capital abroad. As in Masson et al. (1998), other factors that are found to have 
a robust impact on private saving are demographics (higher old dependency ratios in the euro 
area countries contribute to a decrease in the private saving rate) and the (lagged) economic 
growth rate (with a positive impact).  
Turning to the channel of private investment, somewhat surprisingly, no (direct) impact of 
debt on private investment is found; rather the impact may be indirect through the channel of 
long-term interest rates (as will be shown below). The estimation equation for gross fixed 
                                                      
25  With the exception of the more restrictive xtlsdv model (least square dummy variable model, a dynamic panel model  
      estimated using the bias-corrected fixed-effects as in Bruno, 2005). 
it it it it debt debt rate saving priv rate saving priv 2
2
1 1 1 0 . . . . γ γ α α + + + = −  + other control          
  variables (initial level GDP/cap; economic growth rate; population growth; tax    
              rate; credit-to-GDP ratio; old and young people dependency ratio; LT interest      
              rates; openness) it t i ε ν µ + + +       (eq. 2)21
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1237
August 2010
capital formation is as follows:  
 
As shown in Table 2 Appendix 3, the results across various models are neither conclusive nor 
robust, the debt variables turning mostly insignificant.  
Switching to public investment (government gross fixed capital formation), the following 
regression equation is proposed:  
 
The results are broadly robust across various models and point to a similar concave 
relationship between public debt and public investment, yet with a turning point ranging from 
45% of GDP to 68% of GDP. Above this threshold range, the negative association between 
public debt and public investment can be explained by the fact that, in their consolidation 
efforts, governments may tend to cut expenditure allotted for public investment, including 
maintenance of public infrastructure. Such a pattern is also documented in Chalk and Tanzi 
(2002).  
As in Pattillo et al. (2002) and Schclarek (2004), we also analyse the impact of debt on total 
factor productivity (TFP), according to the following regression equation:  
 
The estimation results, presented in Table 4 Appendix 3, point to a similar concave 
relationship between public debt and TFP, this time the turning point, beyond which debt 
affects TFP negatively, being higher, i.e. above 100% of GDP. 
Finally, as regards the potential impact of public debt on long-term (LT) sovereign interest 
rates, the following regression equations are proposed for nominal and, respectively, real 
interest rates.  
gfcf_gov  =  0 α  +  1 α L.gfcf_gov +  debt debt 2
2
1 γ γ + + other controls (private investment;  
economic growth rate; initial level of GDP/cap; gov. budget balance; LT interest rates; 
openness indicators) + it t i ε ν µ + +      (eq. 4) 
gfcf_priv =  0 α  +  1 α L.gfcf_priv +  debt debt 2
2
1 γ γ + + other controls (public investment;  
economic growth rate; initial level of GDP/cap; tax rate; private credit-to-GDP ratio; LT 
interest rates; openness indicators) + it t i ε ν µ + +       (eq. 3)
TFP =  0 α  +  1 α L.TFP +  debt debt 2
2
1 γ γ + + other controls (lagged economic growth rate; 
 population growth rate; old and young dependency ratio; private credit-to-GDP ratio; LT 
interest rates; openness indicators) + it t i ε ν µ + +       (eq. 5) 22
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The estimation equation for real LT sovereign interest rates is similar: 
 
While a non-linear impact of the public debt-to-GDP ratio is mostly unveiled for the first 
three channels, a strong and robust impact on sovereign long-term nominal as well as real 
interest rates is found to come from the change in the debt ratio (first difference) and from 
the primary budget balance ratio. The level of the public debt ratio (in either linear or 
quadratic forms) is not found to be significant on average in determining long-term interest 
rates in our sample. The change in the public debt ratio and the primary budget balance prove 
to be highly statistically significant and remain robust even after controlling for short-term 
interest rates (the latter variable, which is highly correlated with long-term interest rates, is 
included in the regression estimation in order to capture monetary policy effects). A one 
percentage point acceleration in the change of public debt ratio appears to determine on 
average an increase in the sovereign long-term real interest rate for our sample by about 7 
basis points (see Table 5.1. in Appendix 3) and in nominal interest rates by 11 basis points 
(see Table 5.2. in Appendix 3). While the results regarding the relationship between public 
debt/government balance and the long-term interest rates need further investigation, they are 
broadly in line with conclusions of recent studies such as Ardagna et al. (2007) and Laubach 
(2009).  
4.  Conclusions and areas for further research 
This analysis finds evidence for a non-linear impact of public debt on per-capita GDP growth 
rate across twelve euro area countries over a long period of time starting in 1970. It unveils a 
concave (inverted U-shape) relationship between the public debt and the economic growth 
rate with the debt turning point at about 90-100% of GDP. This means that a higher public 
debt-to-GDP ratio is associated, on average, with lower long-term growth rates at debt levels 
above the range of 90-100% of GDP. The long-term perspective is reinforced by the 
evidence of a similar impact of the public debt on the potential/trend GDP growth rate. From 
LT_nom_i =  0 α +  1 α ST_nom_i  +  debt D. 1 γ  + other controls (inflation rate; gov. primary              
                    balance; lagged economic growth rate; output gap; external balance and openness      
                    indicators) + it t i ε ν µ + +     (eq. 6) 
LT_real_i =  0 α +  1 α ST_real_i  +  debt D. 1 γ  + other controls (gov. primary balance; lagged  
                   economic growth rate; output gap; external balance and openness indicators)  
                   + it t i ε ν µ + +    (eq. 7) 23
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an econometric perspective, the paper deals with the potential endogeneity problem, in 
particular with the issue of simultaneity or reverse causation, in various ways including: (i) 
using 1-year and 5-year forward growth rates, as well as the potential and trend GDP growth 
rates, to mitigate/eliminate the impact of the economic cycle; (ii) using a quadratic 
relationship in debt, while the linear one (which would be implied by the converse relation, 
i.e. lower economic growth induces, ceteris paribus, a higher debt-to-GDP ratio) is not found 
to be significant; (iii) using instrumental variable estimation models.  
The public debt threshold of 90-100% of GDP is an average for the (12-country) euro area 
and its statistical confidence may go as low as 70% of GDP. This suggests that for many 
countries current debt levels already may have a detrimental impact on GDP growth, given 
that the euro area average debt-to-GDP ratio (estimated to increase from 78.7% in 2009 to 
88.5% in 2011) is already above the lower threshold. This evidence constitutes an additional 
warning signal for policy-makers (this time from a long-term growth perspective).  
Annual changes in the debt level (first difference of the debt ratio) are also found to be 
negatively associated with annual economic growth rate.  
The channels through which public debt is likely to have an impact on economic growth rate 
seem to be private saving, public investment, total factor productivity, and sovereign long-
term nominal and real interest rates.  
The question remains whether public debt is indeed associated with higher growth below the 
90-100% turning point. This is a relevant issue even in view of the additional evidence in this 
analysis, showing that the debt turning points for the first two channels (private saving and 
public investment) seem to be much below the range of 90-100%. A possible explanation for 
a positive impact of higher debt (i.e. accumulated past deficits) on growth would be if those 
deficits were used to finance productive public investment. However, empirically, a large 
part of the debt increases of the past decades are related to higher public consumption and 
transfers. Taking this into account, a potential link could lie in the extent of past absorption 
of adverse exogenous shocks by governments, which were not compensated by debt-reducing 
measures afterwards. If such shocks result in a lower growth potential, their absorption via 
higher deficits may arguably provide an explanation of the above results.  
Yet, government budget deficits are found to be linearly and negatively associated with the 
growth rate of both real and potential output. The fact that the change in the debt ratio and 
the budget deficits are linearly and negatively associated with growth (and with the long-term 
interest rates) may point to a more detrimental impact of the public debt stock even below the 
threshold. Hence, targeting a higher debt level to support growth is not a policy option. Any 24
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policy with such a target would reduce the leeway of governments before the debt burden has 
an unmistakably adverse growth impact.  
In the current economic environment, the results represent an additional argument in favour 
of swiftly implementing ambitious strategies for debt reduction. If policy makers let high 
debt ratios linger for fear that fiscal consolidation measures will be unpopular with voters, 
this will undermine growth prospects and thus will put an additional burden on fiscal 
sustainability. This debt-based argument thus adds to the positive growth effects of fiscal 
deficit reduction found in the literature for the long term and frequently also in the short 
term.
26  
It should be noted that the econometric results and the economic interpretation rest on the 
analysis of the long time period since 1970. Thus they apply to what could be broadly called 
“normal” economic times, some short-term disruptions in past decades notwithstanding. 
Recent fiscal and financial market developments for some countries carry characteristics of 
crisis situations which call for emergency policy responses. While, ideally, the long-term 
economic relationships established in the literature should provide the basis also for such 
short-term policy strategies, their value for concrete policy decisions may be more limited. 
 
                                                      
26   See Alesina and Ardagna (2009).  25
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Appendix 1 
Table 1: Data description and sources 
Variable abbrev.  Variable name/description  Source 
gov_debt  Gross government debt (% GDP)  AMECO 
gov_bal  Government budget balance (% of GDP)  AMECO 
gov_primary_bal  Government budget primary balance (excl. interest payments; % of GDP)  AMECO 
gov_cab  Cyclically adjusted gov. balance (% of GDP at market prices)  AMECO 
gov_rev_ca  Cyclically adjusted gov. revenue (% of GDP at market prices)  AMECO 
GDP_cap  GDP at 2000 market prices per head of population (1000 euro)  AMECO 
PotentialGDP  Potential gross domestic product at 2000 market prices (bill. EUR)  AMECO 
TrendGDP  Trend gross domestic product at 2000 market prices (bill. EUR)  AMECO 
pop_growth  Total population - growth rate  AMECO 
openness  Calculated as sum of exports and imports (% of GDP)  AMECO 
CA_bal  Current account balance (% GDP)  AMECO 
gfcf_total  Gross fixed capital formation: total economy (% GDP)  AMECO 
gfcf_gov  Gross fixed capital formation: general government  (% GDP)  AMECO 
gfcf_priv  Gross fixed capital formation: private sector (% GDP)  AMECO 
saving_total  Gross national saving: total economy (%GDP)  AMECO 
saving_pub  Gross saving: general government (% GDP)  AMECO 
saving_priv  Gross saving: private sector (% GDP)  AMECO 
reer 




Nominal long-term (LT) interest rates, sovereign (mostly central government 
LT bond yields) 
AMECO 
LT_real_i  Real long-term interest rates, sovereign; deflator: GDP at market prices  AMECO 
ST_nom_i  Nominal short-term (ST) interest rates (3M-EURIBOR after 1999)  AMECO 
ST_real_i  Real short-term interest rates; deflator: GDP at market prices  AMECO 
Inflation (GDPdefl.)  Annual rate of change in GDP deflator at market prices  AMECO 
output_gap  Gap between actual and trend GDP at 2000 market prices/trend GDP   AMECO 
old_dep_ratio 




Age dependency ratio, young (% of population under 15 in working-age 
population) 
WDI 
credit_priv  Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  WDI 
TFP_g 
Growth rate of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), calculated based on 
TFP_index (2000=100) 
AMECO 
Note: Sources of basic data are the European Commission’s AMECO database and the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 
In the regression tables presented in Appendix 2, the following symbols are also annexed to several variables: 
L. (denotes the first time lag of variable); ln (natural logarithm of variable); _sq (square term of variable); _g 
(annual growth rate of variable); _5yg (5-year overlapping growth rate of variable).29
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Appendix 2: Direct relationship between debt and per-capita GDP growth  
Table 1: Fixed effects (FE) models 
FE models  Annual growth rate  Cumulative 5 year 
overlapping growth rate 
Cumulative 5 year           
non-overlapping growth rate 
Variables  model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4     model 5  model 6    
























gov_rev_ca  -0.0511 -0.094 -0.3112 -0.1906 -0.3297 -0.2227 
gov_cab  0.2484*** 0.3083***  1.1756***  0.9392**  1.3120***  1.1244 
ln_GDP_cap  0.5403 -0.0036  -9.704  -20.5168**  -7.9847 -14.2007 
pop_growth  -1.3086*** -1.1997**  -3.6186***  -2.7678*  -3.6534**  -3.9632* 
gfcf_total  0.0087  -   -   -      -  
gfcf_gov  -  0.3988***  0.6483 -    0.4319 -   
gfcf_priv  -  -0.047  -0.4018**  -    -0.4034*  -   
saving_pub  - -    -    -0.4572      -0.4535 
saving_priv  - -    -    0.0601      0.0266 
openness  0.0307** 0.0341**  0.1975*** 0.1643***    0.1622*  0.1338 
LT_real_i  0.0234 0.0017  0.1974 -0.1935  0.0758 -0.3489 








Included (7)   
(1975-2005) 
Included (7)   
(1975-2005) 
Country dummies  Included (12)  Included (12)  Included (12)  Included (12)  Included (12)  Included (12) 
_cons  -0.8206 -0.0238  37.1960**  61.3611** 33.9344 46.2412 
N  412  406  382  314 81 68 
R2-within  0.62  0.62 0.73 0.76 0.84 0.85 
AR  correction  lag(2)  lag(2) lag(5) lag(5) lag(2) lag(2) 
debt turning point  97.8  103.1  104.5  99.9  104.6  98.2 
95% CI bootstrap 
- normal-based CI 
- percentile CI 
- bias-corrected CI 
95% CI nlcom  






























Note: The dependent variable is the economic growth rate (annual; cumulative 5-year overlapping, and 
respectively, cumulative 5-year non-overlapping). The abbreviations for the explanatory variables are explained 
in Table 1, Appendix 1. Countries included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.  The table shows the estimated 
coefficients and their significance level (*10%; **5%, ***1%). For the main variable of interest—government 
debt—and its square, standard errors (SE) are also shown in parentheses. The confidence intervals (CI) of the 
debt turning point are generated through bootstrapping based on (i) a normal distribution; (ii) percentile 
distribution; (iii) bias-corrected distribution. Where CI are not shown, the bootstrapping procedure rendered 
unstable CI or an estimation of the bootstrapped SE was not possible due to “lack of observations”. The nlcom 
command implements the delta method to calculate CI. 30
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Table 3: Regression results with debt in first difference (FE models) 
FE models  
(debt in first 
difference D1.) 




Cumulative        
5-year             
non-overlapping 
growth rate 
Variables  model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  








D1.gov_debt_sq  0.0022     -    -  
gov_rev_ca  -0.0156 -0.0174  0.1011  0.1861 
gov_cab  0.0915 0.0944*  0.6058  0.9803 
ln_GDP_cap  -4.2250*** -4.1936***  -31.6788***  -30.7624** 
pop_growth  -1.3455*** -1.3436***  -3.1521**      -3.9527** 
gfcf_gov  0.3179** 0.3177**  -     -   
gfcf_priv  -0.0496 -0.0523  -     -   
saving_pub        0.1580***   -1.1139 
saving_priv        -0.247  0.2737 
openness  0.0401*** 0.0409***  0.1580***    0.1321 






Included (36)   
(1971-2006) 
Included (7)   
(1975-2005) 
Country 
dummies  Included (11)  Included (11)  Included (11)  Included (11) 
_cons  14.3755*** 14.3649***  34.7731*  38.2277* 
N 406  406  382  81 
R2-within 0.60  0.60  0.74  0.83 
AR correction  lag(2)  lag(2)  lag(5)  lag(2) 32
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Robustness checks  
 
a) Controlling for private credit  
 
Table 4: Estimation results from regression equations controlling for variable credit_priv 
 
   Annual growth rate 
Variable  model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4 
-  L(1/5).govdebt  Avg. govdebt(n-i)  Avg. govdebt(n-i)  Instruments/                  
Estimator FE    2SLS  GMM (h.a.)*  GMM (h.a.)* 
Variable        








gov_debt_sq  -0.0006*** 







credit_priv  -0.0021 0.0051  -0.0111  -0.0203* 
ln_GDP_cap  0.1051 2.5697  -5.0043*  -3.7716* 
gov_ca_rev  -0.0916 0.0116  -0.0306  -0.2646** 
gov_cab  0.3029*** 0.2114**      0.3697***  0.6557*** 
pop_growth  -1.1910** -1.7718***    -0.957  -0.7651 
gfcf_gov  0.3909** - -  0.8307*** 
gfcf_priv  -0.0479 - -  -0.0344 
saving_pub  - 0.0409 0.0491  - 
saving_priv  - 0.1379***    0.2063*  - 
openness  0.0343** 0.0155*      -0.0035  0.0098 
LT_real_i  -0.0035 -0.2427***    -0.1989*  0.0524 
Year dummies  Included (38)   
(1971-2008) 
Included (38)   
(1971-2008)  - - 
Country dummies  Included (11)  Included (11)  Included (11)  Included (11) 
_cons  1.3521  -8.7638*         
N  400 313 332 400 
R2-adj 0.67  0.64  -  - 
Shea partial R-sq          
(1st stage)  - 0.64 0.89 0.89 
debt turning point  103.0  98.0  87.2  90.9 
95% CI nlcom  (81; 124)  (80; 111)  (72; 101)  (80; 102) 
 33
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b) Robustness of the polynomial functional form 
 
Chart 1: Plots of the economic growth rate as a function of public debt (various polynomial forms) 
  Power 1.4                                            Power 1.8                              Power 2 (basic model) 
   f(X) = -0.0256 X
1.4 + 0.2271 X                 f(X) = -0.002 X
1.8 + 0.1385 X             f(X) = -0.0006 X
2 + 0.1198 X 









0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160  
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0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160  
       Power 2.4                                     Power 2.8                                             Power 3       
   f(X) = -0.000067 X
2.4 + 0.0969 X            f(X) = -0.000008 X
2.8 + 0.0827 X          f(X) = -0.000003 X
3 + 0.077329 X 








0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 0 1 6 0  








0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 0 1 6 0  








0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 0 1 6 0  
Note: The third plot (power 2) represents the basic model with estimated coefficients for debt and debt squared as in 
model 1 FE in Table 1, Appendix 2. The coefficients for the other functional forms are derived based on the same 
regression model.  All graphs plot the annual economic growth rate against the government debt-to-GDP ratio for the 
pooled observations (412 in total; 12 countries over 1970-2009). 
 
Table 5: Various functional forms and the resulting debt turning points 
powers  turning point  coefficient power-term 
1.2 103.9 -0.1315*** 
1.4 101.1 -0.0256*** 
1.6 98.7 -0.0067*** 
1.8 95.8 -0.0020*** 
2 99.8  -0.0006*** 
2.2 97.1 -0.0002*** 
2.4 96.8 -0.0001*** 
2.6 96.2    -0.000023*** 
2.8 95.9    -0.000008*** 
3 92.7  -0.000003*** 
Note: The table shows various polynomial forms for the economic growth rate as a function of government debt-to-
GDP ratio, as well as the resulting debt turning points and coefficients of the power-terms. The latter are the estimated 
regression coefficients according to model 1 FE in Table 1, Appendix 2. The significance level of the power-term 
coefficients is also indicated (***1%).   34
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Appendix 3: Analysis of channels through which public debt may influence economic growth 
Table 1: The channel of private saving 
 







model 3  
(FE) 
model 4  
(xtlsdv) 







(0.0445)   
0.0240 
(0.0239) 





(0.0002)   
-0.0001 
(0.0001)  
L.GDP_cap_g  0.2923*** -  0.3726***    0.2392*** 
L.ln_GDP_cap  - -4.3723  -  - 
L.gov_rev_ca  0.0257 0.1104**  -0.3691***     
L.pop_growth  0.9432*** 0.2123  1.2480**     0.4413 
L.credit_priv  -0.0171 -0.0166  -0.0284**     -0.0022 
L.old_dep_ratio  -0.4826* -0.4878**  -0.5091***   -0.2666** 
L.young_dep_ratio  0.1002 -0.0099  0.3186***    0.0693 
L.LT_real_i  0.0434 -0.0264  0.3600***    0.0771 
L.openness  -0.0421** -0.0263 0.0078  -0.0098 
Year dummies  Included (38)   
(1971-2008) 






Country dummies  - -  Included (11)  Included (11) 
_cons  19.4582***  27.4620*  46.2809***     
N 313  313  339  332 
R-within -  -  0.65 
Bias correction 
up to order 
AR correction  -  -  lag(2)  O(1/NT^2) 
Instruments DV  Lag(2/6)  Lag(2/4)  -  - 
ABond test for AR in first-differenced errors     
AR(1) test; p-value  0.0144  0.0166  -  - 
AR(2) test; p-value  0.4210  0.2834  -  - 
debt turning point  92.8  81.1  80.0  - 
95% CI nlcom  (53; 132)  (36; 125)  (42; 118)   
Note for tables 1-5 of Appendix 3:  
Abond denotes dynamic panel models estimated using the GMM Arellano-Bond estimator; xtlsdv denotes dynamic 
panel models estimated using the bias-corrected fixed-effects (least square dummy variable) as in Bruno (2005). All 
regression models use annual data.  DV denotes dependent variable.37
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Table 2: The channel of private investment (gross fixed capital formation)  






model 3  
(FE) 
L.gfcf_priv  0.6490*** 0.6036***  -    
gfcf_gov  -0.5881*** -0.5064** 0.2665 
L.gfcf_gov  0.3339*** 0.1438  -0.0264 












L.GDP_cap_g  0.2203*** -  0.1496** 
L.ln_GDP_cap  - 2.5239  - 
L.gov_ca_rev  -0.1816*** -0.1498***  -0.1656** 
L.credit_priv  -0.0076 -0.0126** 0.0087 
L.LT_real_i  -0.0994*** -0.1105***  -0.3186*** 
L.openness  0.0062 0.0188  -0.0167 
Year dummies  Included (38)   
(1971-2008) 




Country dummies  - -  Included  (11) 
_cons  13.7089*** 6.2523  30.1428*** 
N 313  313  339 
R-within -  -  0.51 
AR correction  -  -  lag(2) 
Instruments DV  Lag(2/6)  Lag(2/4)  - 
ABond test for AR in first-differenced errors   
AR(1) test; p-value  0.014  0.0127  - 
AR (2) test; p-value  0.2852  0.2854  - 
debt turning point  -  -  - 38
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Table 3: The channel of public investment (public gross fixed capital formation) 





model 2  
(FE) 
model 3  
(xtlsdv) 
L.gfcf_gov  0.7814***   0.8983***  0.9568*** 
gfcf_priv  -0.0467***   -0.0359  -0.0366*** 
L.gfcf_priv  0.0705**   0.0462*  0.0463*** 
L.gov_debt  0.0140 





L.gov_debt_sq  -0.0002** 





L.gov_bal  0.0315***   0.0314***  0.0347*** 
L.GDP_cap_g  0.0180*   0.0211*  0.0206** 
L.LT_real_i  0.0166   0.0144  0.0101 
L.openness  0.0041**   -0.0003  -0.0004 
Year dummies  Included (38)   





Country dummies      Included (11)  Included (11) 
_cons  -0.3749   -0.3295     
N 393    406  406 
R-within     0.89 
Bias correction 
up to order 
AR correction      lag(2)  O(1/NT^2) 
Instruments DV  Lag(2/6)    -   
ABond test for AR in first-differenced errors   
AR(1) test; p-value  0.0258       
AR (2) test; p-value  0.1639       
debt turning point  46.9    54.9  69.6 
95% CI nlcom  (19; 75)    (17; 93)  (36; 103) 39
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Table 4: The channel of total factor productivity (TFP growth) 
  





model 2  
(FE)  




L.TFP_g  0.1881 -    0.3591***  - 
L.TFP_5yg  - -    -  0.9798*** 
gov_debt  0.1486*** 
(0.0475) 
0.0455** 





gov_debt_sq  -0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002** 





L.GDP_cap_g  -0.4761*** -0.0684    -0.2684***  -0.3837*** 
pop_growth  -0.2178 -0.4758    -0.5432** -0.7966 
old_dep_ratio  -0.0538 -0.1398**   -0.1280*  0.1960 
young_dep_ratio  -0.0416 -0.0329    -0.0456 -0.0313 
credit_priv  -0.0102 -0.0016    -0.0034  0.0094 
LT_real_i  0.0461 0.0486    0.0369  -0.0869 
L.ToT_g  -0.0588*** -0.0543    -0.0299  0.1354** 
Year dummies  Included (38)   
(1971-2008) 






Country dummies    Included (11)    Included (11)   
_cons  -0.3362 -0.6678        -5.7329 
N 389  408    408  365 
R-within -  0.46   
Bias 
correction up 
to order  - 
AR correction  -  lag(2)    O(1/NT^2)  - 
Instruments DV  Lag(2/6)  -    -  Lag(2/6) 
ABond test for AR in first-differenced errors       
AR(1) test; p-value  0.0037  -    -  0.0076 
AR (2) test; p-value  0.5674  -    -  0.3967 
debt turning point  109.3  107.7    -  137.2 
95% CI nlcom  (52; 167)  (64; 151)      (62; 213) 40
ECB








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lag(5) Working PaPer SerieS
no 1118 / november 2009
DiScretionary  
FiScal PolicieS  
over the cycle
neW eviDence  
baSeD on the eScb 
DiSaggregateD aPProach
by Luca Agnello  
and Jacopo Cimadomo